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Abstract—In this work, we investigate the physical layer security
of a jamming-based underlay cognitive hybrid satellite-terrestrial
network consisting of a radio frequency link at the first hop and an
optical feeder at the second hop. Particularly, one secondary user
(SU) is transmitting data to an end-user optical ground station (D)
through the aid of a relay satellite, in the presence of an active
eavesdropper at each hop. Moreover, another SU located in the first
hop is acting as a friendly jammer and continuously broadcasting
an artificial noise that cannot be decoded by the wiretapper
so as to impinge positively on the system’s secrecy. Owing to
the underlying strategy, the SUs are permanently adjusting their
transmit powers in order to avoid causing harmful interference
to primary users. The RF channels undergo shadowed-Rician
and Rayleigh fading models, while the optical link is subject
to Gamma-Gamma turbulence with pointing error. Closed-form
and asymptotic expressions for the intercept probability (IP)
are derived considering two different scenarios regardless of the
channel’s conditions, namely (i) absence and (ii) presence of a
friendly jammer. The effect of various key parameters on IP,
e.g., sources’ transmit power, artificial noise, maximum tolerated
interference power, and fading severity parameters are examined.
Precisely, we aim to answer the following question: could a friendly
jammer further enhance the security of such a system even in a low
SNR regime? All the derived results are corroborated by Monte
Carlo simulations and new insights into the considered system’s
secrecy are gained.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio networks, eavesdropping, free-
space optics, intercept probability, jamming signals, physical layer
security, satellite communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the arrival of the fifth-generation (5G) wireless cellular
network and the increasing number of smart mobile devices
along with the corresponding Internet of Things (IoT) applica-
tions, the demand for high-speed communications is increasing
as well. Moreover, providing connectivity to rural areas and
achieving worldwide connectivity is expected to be accom-
plished in sixth-generation (6G) communication networks [1],
[2]. In this context, hybrid satellite-terrestrial systems have been
widely advocated among appropriate schemes to enlarge the
network’s coverage in 6G networks. Such networks operate in a
conventional Ku (12 GHz) and Ka (26.5-40 GHz) bands. Their
aim consists of ensuring a higher data rate (e.g., tens to hundreds
of Megabits per second) per end-user, and provide high-speed
communications to users in particular areas characterized by a
low quality of service when traditional terrestrial networks are
employed. With the objective of fulfilling the aforementioned
data rate requirements, hundreds of Gbps of aggregate through-
put link should be allocated for the ground-satellite connection.
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Indeed, one of the omnipresent issues in setting up such high-
speed networks lies in bandwidth limitation of a radio-frequency
(RF) spectrum, particularly in the Ku and Ka-bands, which
restricts the coverage of such systems to a limited number of
end-users [3]. In this regard, hybrid satellite-terrestrial cognitive
network (HSTCN), employed jointly with free-space optical
(FSO) technology could provide an efficient solution to alleviate
the spectrum scarcity issue.
Remarkably, HSTCN has received considerable attention dur-
ing the last years. For instance, the project cognitive radio
for satellite communications (CoRaSat) [4] has proposed the
implementation of dynamic and smart spectrum usage tech-
niques for satellite communications (SatCom) in view to exploit
either the underused or unused frequency resources that have
been already assigned to other services. Furthermore, high-speed
communication (e.g., Tbps per optical beam) can be achieved
by employing FSO technology [5] where the data is transmitted
with the help of an optical source emitting light beams in either
visible (400-800 nm) or infrared (1500-1550 nm) spectrum
bands.
Interestingly, FSO communication is most immune to the
interference and provide a high level of security againstÂa˘wire-
tapping attacks due to its narrow beamwidth. In contrast,
the broadcast nature of RF wireless communication makes it
vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks. Moreover, allowing the
unlicensed users to share the spectrum with the licensed ones
in CRNs can increase the risk of overhearing the signalsÂa˘of
legitimate transmitters. In this context, physical layer security
(PLS) has been proposed as an efficient solution to support
and supplement existing cryptography protocols that are used
in higher network layers. Its concept was first introduced in
the seminal work of Wyner [6], therein, it has been shown
that better secrecy can be achieved if the legitimate channel’s
capacity exceeds that of the eavesdropper one by a certain rate
threshold. Towards this end, the main concern of PLS is to
strengthen the secrecy capacity and therefore to improve the SS.
Actually, various techniques have been suggested to enhance the
SS, namely, artificial noises, relay selection protocols, energy
harvesting, cooperative communications, spatial diversity and
combining techniques, massive multiple-input and multiple-
output, non-orthogonal multiple access, zero-forcing precoding
techniques, etc.
Recently, several works have been conducted into the secrecy
analysis of CRNs with various system strategies [7]-[21]. For
instance, non-cooperative CRNs in theÂa˘presence of a direct
link between the source and the destination have been consid-
ered in [7]-[10]. Specifically, it has been assumed in [7] that
both sources and receivers are equipped with multiple antennas,
whereas in [8]-[10] multiple antennas are considered exclusively
at the receivers. The PLS of dual-hop relay-assisted CRNs
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was investigated in [11]-[14]. Explicitly, multiple and single
eavesdropper have been considered for various relay selection
protocols in [11],[12] and [13],[14], respectively. Moreover, the
secrecy outage probability (SOP) was derived by examining
two scenarios, namely the selection of the relay maximizing the
achievable secrecy rate was presented in [11], while the wiretap
link signal-to-noise (SNR) minimization-based relay node selec-
tion protocol was analyzed in [12],[13]. Significantly, the impact
of jamming signals on the SS under various jammers’ selection
protocols has been discussed in [15]-[17]. By leveraging the
powerfulness of EH in enhancing the reliability of wireless com-
munication systems, the PLS of EH-based CRNs was inspected
by assuming either time-switching or power-splitting protocols
in [18] and [19]-[21], respectively. Furthermore, the energy was
considered to be harvested from the PU’s and SU’s signals in
[18]-[19] and [20]-[21], respectively.
A. Motivation and contributions
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, very few research
works have investigated the PLS of HSTCNs. The secrecy
analysis of HSTCN where the terrestrial secondary network is
sharing the spectrum with a satellite system, acting as a primary
network is examined in [22] by maximizing the SUs rate and
considering various beamforming techniques. Distinctively, the
authors in [23] dealt with the minimization of the total transmit
power of numerous terrestrial base stations and on board the
satellite subject to the PU secrecy rate constraint. Later, the
average secrecy capacity (ASC) and SOP of a downlink hybrid
satellite-FSO cooperative system were derived in [24] by consid-
ering both amplify-and-forward and decode-and-forward (DF)
relaying protocols. Likewise, the authors of [25] investigated the
PLS of a hybrid very high throughput satellite communication
system with an FSO feeder link. Therein, a satellite combines
the received data from multiple optical ground stations, performs
a decoding process, regenerates the information signal, and
forwards it to the end-user with zero-forcing precoding so that
to cancel the interbeam interference at the receivers.
Motivated by the above, we aim at this work to investigate
the PLS of HSTCNs consisting of one secondary user (SU)
source communicating with a secondary base station through the
aid of relay satellites in presence of two eavesdroppers that are
overhearing both communication hops. Besides, another SU acts
as a friendly jammer at the first hop and broadcasts an artificial
noise to disrupt the eavesdropper. Without loss of generality,
the RF secondary and primary links are undergoing shadowed-
Rician and Rayleigh fading models, respectively, while the FSO
links employed in the second hop are subject to Gamma-Gamma
(GG) fading with pointing error for a DF relaying system, and in
the presence of two eavesdroppers at both communication hops,
deriving the IP is not straight forward. Therefore, the main aim
of this work is to derive a new formula for the IP that considers
the presence of two eavesdroppers for a DF relaying system.
Pointedly, the main contributions of this work can be sum-
marized as follows:
• A novel expression for the IP of a dual-hop DF relaying
in the presence of eavesdroppers at each hop is derived.
• Capitalizing on the above result, the IP expression of
HSTCN is derived in closed-form for both the presence
and absence of friendly jammer scenarios.
• The asymptotic expression for the IP in high SNR regime
is also provided, based on it, the achievable diversity order
is retrieved.
• Insightful discussions on the impact of different key param-
eters of HSTCN on its security are also provided. Specif-
ically, we demonstrated that the SS can be enhanced by
increasing (i) SU’s transmit power, (ii) maximal tolerated
interference power (MTIP) at PU, and (iii) average power
of the downlink channel along with the satellite’s transmit
power. Moreover, we demonstrated that under low source
transmit power and low MTIP constraints, the friendly
jammer does not enhance the SS.
B. Organization of the paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
considered HSTCNs is presented in Section II, while in Section
III, a novel framework for the IP computation of a dual-hop
DF-based CRN is provided, and the closed-form expressions
for the IP of HSTCNs along with the asymptotic analysis are
presented. The numerical and simulation results are presented
and discussed in Section IV. Finally, the last section reports
closing remarks that summarize the current contribution.
C. Notations
For the sake of clarity, the different notations used throughout
the paper are defined and summarized in Table I.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
We consider an underlay cognitive satellite system, presented
in Fig. 1, consisting of two SU sources, namely a data source
S, a jammer source SJ , satellite R that serves as a relay,
one optical ground station D, two eavesdroppers E1 and E2
intercepting the communication at the first and the second hop,
respectively, one primary transmitter PUTx , and one primary
receiver PURx . It is worth mentioning that the jamming signal
sent by SJ can be canceled at the legitimate receiver (i.e. R),
while the eavesdropper E1 is not able to decode it. Without loss
of generality, the source communicates with the optimal relay
through an RF-link, while at the second hop R forwards data
to D through an optical feeder link. The received signal at R
and E1 are, respectively, given by
yR =
√
PSxShSR + nR, (1)
yE1 =
√
PSxShSE1 + ε
√
PSJxSJhSJE1 + nE1 , (2)
while, the received signal at node Z ∈ {D,E2} is given by
yZ =
√
PRωZ (ηIZ)
r
2 xR + nZ , (3)
where, ε is either equal to 0 or to 1 in absence or presence
of artificial noise, respectively. PTx, xTx, nRx, η, ωZ are
defined in Table I, IZ is the irradiance of the link R-D,(
i.e.,IZ = I
(a)
Z I
(p)
Z I
(l)
Z
)
defined as the product of the irradiance
fluctuation caused by atmospheric turbulence, the pointing error
due to the beam misalignment, and the free-space path loss
(FSPL), respectively. Of note, the latter irradiance can be
expressed as I(l)Z = Ite
−φdZ , with It stands for the laser
emittance. For simplicity reasons, the FSPLâA˘Z´s irradiance is
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TABLE I: List of functions and symbols.
Symbol Meaning Symbol Meaning
h. Fading amplitude E [.] Expectation operator
g. = |h.|2 Channel gain F. (.) Cumulative distribution function (CDF)
PmaxQ Maximum transmit power at Q ∈ {S,SJ} F c. (.) Complementary CDF
PI Maximum tolerated interference power at PURx f. (.) Probability density function (PDF)
PTx Transmit power of node Tx ∈ {S,SJ,R} γinc (., .) Lower incomplete Gamma function [27, Eq. (8.350.1)]
xTx Transmitted signal from the node Tx Γ (., .) Upper incomplete Gamma function [27, Eq. (8.350.2)]
hX Fading amplitudes, X ∈ {SR, SE1, SJE1} IZ Channel irradiance
nRx Additive white Gaussian noise(AWGN) at Rx ∈ {R, D, E1, E2} γth Decoding threshold SNR
ωZ Portion of power received by Z’s photodetector, Z ∈ {D,E2} mX Fading severity parameter
η Optical-to-electrical conversion ratio bX Half average power of the multi-path component
N AWGN power ΩX Average power of LOS component
dZ Distance between the satellite and the node Z r Detection technique parameter
φ Path-loss exponent αZ , βZ Turbulence-induced fading parameters
γR SNR at R γE1 SNR at E1 in the absence of a jammer
γ
(J)
E1
SNR at E1 in the presence of a jammer γZ SNR at node Z
Gm,np,q Meijer’s G-function [27, Eq. (9.301)] UQ SNR at E1
𝐄𝟏 
𝐏𝐔𝐑𝐱 
𝐏𝐔𝐓𝐱 𝐒 𝐒𝐉 D 
𝐄𝟐 
Legitimate link 
Eavesdropping link 
Interference link 
Jamming link 
R 
Fig. 1: System model.
considered normalized to unity (φ = 0). Furthermore, r refers to
the detection technique index (i.e., r = 1 for coherent detection
and r = 2 for direct detection).
To avoid interference with the PU signal, the SNR at R can
be characterized as
γR = min
(
γS ,
γI
gSP
)
gSR, (4)
while the SNR at E1 in the case of absence and presence of a
friendly jammer are, respectively, given by
γE1 = US , (5)
and
γ
(J)
E1
=
US
USJ + 1
, (6)
where
UQ = min
(
γQ,
γI
gQP
)
gQE1 , Q ∈ {S,SJ} , (7)
γQ = P
max
Q /N, and γI = PI/N , with N presents the thermal
power noise at the receivers, assumed identical.
Furthermore, the SNR at node Z ∈ {D,E2} can be straight-
forwardly expressed from (3) as
γZ =
PRωZ (ηIZ)
r
N
. (8)
Given that the satellite R performs the DF protocol, the
equivalent SNR of the end-to-end link is given by
γeq = min (γR, γD) . (9)
All fading amplitudes are assumed to be independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d). Specifically, the amplitudes of the
terrestrial (i.e. S-PURx and SJ -PURx) and uplink channels (i.e.
S-R, S-E1, and SJ -E1) are Rayleigh and shadowed-Rician
distributed, respectively. Therefore, the PDF of the channel gain
corresponding to the latter channel can be characterized as
fgX (x) = ∆Xe
−βXx
1F1 (mX ; 1; δXx) (10)
(a)
= ∆Xe
−υXx
mX−1∑
n=0
φ
(n)
X x
n, X ∈ {SR, SE1,SJE1},
where ∆X = 12bX
(
2bXmX
2bXmX+ΩX
)mX
, υX = βX − δX , βX =
1
2bX
, δX =
βXΩX
2bXmX+ΩX
, φ
(n)
X =
(mX−1)!δnX
(mX−1−n)!(n!)2 , 1F1(.; .; .)
denotes the confluent hypergeometric function [27, Eq. (9.210)],
and step (a) follows by assuming that mX is a positive-
valued number and by using jointly Eqs. (06.10.02.0003.01)
and (07.20.03.0025.01) of [28]. The corresponding CDF can
be straightforwardly obtained from the above PDF as
FgX (x) = ∆X
mX−1∑
n=0
φ
(n)
X
∫ x
0
t
n
e−υXtdt (11)
= ∆X
mX−1∑
n=0
φ
(n)
X
υn+1X
γinc (n+ 1, υXx),
where γinc (., .) denotes the lower incomplete Gamma function
[27, Eq. (8.350.1)].
On the other hand, as the atmospheric turbulence induced-
fading with pointing error for the received optical beam is
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modeled with Gamma-Gamma distribution, the PDF and CDF
of the SNR γZ are expressed, respectively as [26]
fγZ (z) =
OZ
rz
G3,01,3
ΥZ r√ z
µ
(Z)
r
∣∣∣∣ −; ξ2Z + 1ξ2Z , αZ , βZ ;−
 , (12)
FγZ (z) =
rαZ+βZ−2OZ
(2pi)
r−1 G
3r,1
r+1,3r+1
(
ΥrZz
r2rµ
(Z)
r
∣∣∣∣∣ 1;κ(Z)1κ(Z)2 ; 0
)
,
(13)
where r√. denotes the rth root, OZ = ξ
2
Z
Γ(αZ)Γ(βZ)
, µ
(Z)
r =
E [γZ ], ΥZ = ξ
2
ZαZβZ
ξ2Z+1
, κ
(Z)
1 =
{
ξ2Z+i
r
}
i=1..r
, κ
(Z)
2 ={
ξ2Z+i
r ,
αZ+i
r ,
βZ+i
r
}
i=0..r−1
, and Gm,np,q
(
z
∣∣∣∣ (ai)i≤p(bk)k≤q
)
de-
notes the Meijer G-function [27, Eq. (9.301)]
III. INTERCEPT PROBABILITY
In this section, we derive closed-form and asymptotic expres-
sions for the IP of the considered HSTCN. The IP is defined
as the probability of the legitimate link capacity falls below the
wiretap channel one.
IP = Pr (Csec ≤ 0) , (14)
where Csec represents the system’s secrecy capacity and it can
be expressed as
Csec = min (C1S , C2S) , (15)
with
C1S = log2
(
1 + γR
1 + γE1
)
, (16)
and
C2S = min
(
log2
(
1 + γR
1 + γE2
)
, log2
(
1 + γD
1 + γE2
))
. (17)
Remark 1. One can see from (14) that the system’s secrecy
can be enhanced by increasing Csec. This can be achieved by
either increasing the SNRs at legitimate nodes (i.e.,R andD) or
decreasing the SNRs at the eavesdroppers at both hops. To this
end, the system’s secrecy is impacted by two main factors: (i)
transmit power of the sources, and (ii) fading severity exhibited
by different channels. Owing to that, it can be clearly noticed
from (4) and (6) that increasing either γI or γS enhances the
SNR at R, while increasing γSJ decreases the SNR at E1.
Particularly, the presence of a friendly jammer decreases this
latter metric as can be ascertained in (6) and (5). Furthermore,
above a certain threshold of either γI or γS , both legitimate
and eavesdropper SNRs depend exclusively of either γS or
γI , respectively as can be observed in (6)-(7). Consequently,
the IP remains steady in both aforementioned cases. Likewise,
it can be noticed from (8) that the capacities of the second-
hop channels are affected by various parameters including the
satellite’s transmit power and the average powers of both LOS
and multipath components of the downlink turbulence channel.
A. New framework for the IP
In order to derive the closed-form and asymptotic expressions
for the IP of the considered HSTCN, we have to provide
first a framework for IP’s evaluation of a dual-hop cognitive
system in the presence of an eavesdropper at each hop when
the relay performs the DF protocol. Next, both closed-form
and asymptotic expressions of the IP for the considered system
are provided under two scenarios, namely (i) absence, and (ii)
presence of a friendly jamming signal.
Lemma 1. For a dual-hop cognitive network-aided DF relay-
ing protocol experiencing generalized fading models over the
intercepting attempt of two wiretappers E1 and E2 at the first
and the second hop, respectively, the IP can be evaluated as
IP = 1−
∫ ∞
u=0
fgSP (u)R1 (u) du, (18)
where
R1 (u) =
∫ ∞
y=γth
J1 (y, u)J2 (y) dy, (19)
J1 (y, u) = fγR|gSP=u (y)FγE1 |gSP=u (y) , (20)
and
J2 (y) =
∫ y
z=0
fγE2 (z)F
c
γD (z) dz, (21)
where F c. (.) denotes the complementary CDF.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A. 
B. IP closed-form
Theorem 1. The closed-form expressions for IP of the consid-
ered HSTCN under the considered fading models is given by
(33) as shown at the top of the next page, for both absence (i.e.
E = A) and presence (i.e. E = P ) of a friendly jamming, where
e(Z,τ) =
Γ
(
αZ − ξ2Z
)
Γ
(
βZ − ξ2Z
)
τ + ξ2Z
, (22)
e(Z,τ,k) (x, y) =
(−1)k Γ (x− y − k)
k! (ξ2Z − y − k) (τ + y + k)
, (23)
ξ2Z 6= y + k,
B(n1,n2,n3,p) =
(
n2
p
)
φ
(n1)
SJE1
φ
(n2)
SE1
φ
(n3)
SR
υn1+1SJE1υ
p
SE1
, (24)
Ψ
(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ)
2 =
%τD (ΥE2%E2)
a
ζn2+n3−p+1+a+τ
(25)
×
[
FgSP (σS)M(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ)
+λSPσ
a+τ
S Y(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ)
]
,
Ψ
(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ)
3 =
%τD (ΥE2%E2)
a
ζn2+n3−p+1+a+τ
(26)
×
[
FgSP (σS) Φ
(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ)
+λSPσ
a+τ
S W(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ)
]
,
θ = OD ×OE2 , (27)
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%Z =
γS
µ
(Z)
1
, (28)
σQ =
γI
γQ
, (29)
I =
γth
γI
, (30)
χ =
υSJE1ζ
υSE1
, (31)
ζ = υSR + υSE1 , (32)
τ ∈ {0, q}, q ∈ {ξ2D, αD + k, βD + k},
Gm,np,q
(
z
∣∣∣∣ (al, bl)l≤p(cu, du)u≤q
)
accounts for the upper incomplete
Meijer’s G-function [29, Eq. (1.1.1)], j =
√−1, and Cs and
Cw are two vertical lines of integration chosen so as to separate
left poles of the integrand functions in (41) and (43), from the
right ones.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix B. 
C. Asymptotic IP
In this subsection, we provide an asymptotic analysis of
the derived closed-form expression for the IP in high SNR
regime. It can be noticed from (40), (42), (41), and (43) that the
expression for the IP can be approximated for high SNR values
by considering γI →∞.
Theorem 2. The Asymptotic expression for the IP in the
presence of a friendly jammer is given by (46) as shown at
the top of page 7, with
Ψ
(0,n2,n3,p,a,τ)
2 = σSJV(n2,n3,p,a,τ), (44)
Ψ
(0,n2,n3,p,a,τ)
3 =
Γ (2 + n1, σSJλSJP )
λSJP
V(n2,n3,p,a,τ), (45)
and V(n2,n3,p,a,τ) is given by (49) as shown at the same
aforementioned page.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix C. 
Remark 2. It is worth mentioning that the expression for the IP
in the absence of a friendly jammer does not have an asymptotic
expression as (34) is independent of γI .
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this part, the derived analytical results are validated through
Monte Carlo simulation by generating 106 random samples
and setting the parameters are summarized in Table II. The
turbulence parameters of the FSO hops were generated based on
OGS-satellite distance, wavelength, and aperture radius accord-
ing to [30, Eqs. (4, 9-10)] and [31, Eqs. (8)]. The main point
of note from Figures 2-7 is that all closed-form and simulation
curves are perfectly matching for numerous system parameters’
values, showing the high accuracy of our results.
Fig. 2 depicts the IP versus γI for various values of ΩX . It is
clearly seen that the greater γI is, the smaller the IP is. This can
be justified from (4) by the fact that when the MTIP at the PU
TABLE II: Simulation parameters.
Parameter bX mX ΩX λQP αZ
Value 1.4 2 3 0.8 6.1096
Parameter βZ ξZ γth(dB) γI (dB) γS (dB)
Value 1.0794 1.1227 2 9 60
Parameter γSJ (dB) µE2 (dB) µD(dB) η ωD
Value 10 20 40 0.7 0.7
receiver increases, the SU is allowed to use its maximal transmit
power, which contributes to the improvement of the SS.
Figures 3 and 4 show the IP versus γI and γS , respectively,
for various values of γSJ . It can be ascertained that the IP
decreases with the increase of γI , γS , and γSJ as explained in
Remark 1. Also, it can be noticed that the presence of a friendly
jammer improves the SS per the same Remark. However, one
can notice that for low values of γI and γS , the friendly jammer
does not contribute to the enhancement of the SS. In fact, it can
be seen from (7) that the smaller γI and γS are, the smaller
US is. Thus, it follows from (5) and (6) that both γE1 and γ
(J)
E1
approach 0. Moreover, it can be observed that above certain
thresholds of either γI or γS , respectively, the IP becomes
steady as discussed in Remark 1.
Fig. 5 shows the IP versus γSJ for various values of ΩX .
As can be seen, the IP decreases with the increasing values
of the γSJ . This can be justified from (6) as increasing γSJ
decreases the SNR at the eavesdropper which reduces the
wiretap link capacity. Consequently, the secrecy capacity gets
enhanced which results in an improvement of the SS.
Fig. 6 illustrates the IP as a function of µD in the presence
and absence of a friendly jammer for various values of ΩX .
The greater µD is, the greater the legitimate end-user SNR
is, leading to the improvement of the SS. This behavior can
be interpreted as increasing µD leads to the enhancement of
the SNR at the destination which improves the legitimate link
capacity accordingly.
Figures 7 and 8 depict the IP as a function of the average
power of the LOS and multipath components in the presence
and absence of a friendly jammer. These powers are assumed
to be identical for all channels i.e., ΩSR = ΩSE1 = ΩSJE1 ,
and bSR = bSE1 = bSJE1 . One can ascertain that increasing
the average powers of the LOS and multi-path components at
the first hop result in an enhancement of the SS. Moreover,
it is clearly seen that the presence of a friendly jammer is
strengthening the SS. For instance, one can see that for ΩX = 6
and bX = 6, IP equals 0.35 and 0.61 in the presence and absence
of a friendly jammer, respectively.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the physical layer security of a hybrid satellite-
terrestrial cognitive network was investigated. Specifically, the
main aim of this work was to derive a new formula for the IP of
a DF relaying system that takes into consideration the presence
of two eavesdroppers (i.e. at the first and second hop). This
formula was then used to investigate the secrecy performance of
our system by deriving closed-form and asymptotic expressions
for the IP in the presence and absence of a friendly jammer.
By considering different key parameters of the network, our
results demonstrated that the best secrecy can be achieved
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY, VOL. XX, NO. XX, XXX 2015 6
IPE = 1−
ξ2E2D
(0)
E
Γ (αE2) Γ (βE2)
+θ
[
e(D,0)D(ξ
2
D)
E +
∞∑
k=0
e(D,0,k) (βD, αD)D(αD+k)E + e(D,0,k) (αD, βD)D(βD+k)E
]
, E ∈ {A,P} (33)
D(τ)A = ΥτD∆SE1∆SR
mSE1−1∑
n2=0
mSR−1∑
n3=0
φ
(n3)
SR φ
(n2)
SE1
υn2+1SE1
 e(E2,τ)N (n2,n3,ξ2E2 ,τ)1 +∑∞k=0 e(E2,τ,k) (βE2 , αE2)N (n2,n3,αE2+k,τ)1
+
∑∞
k=0 e
(E2,τ,k) (αE2 , βE2)N (
n2,n3,βE2+k,τ)
1
 .
(34)
D(τ)P = ΥτD∆SR
[ ∑mSR−1
n3=0
φ
(n3)
SR Ξ
(n3,τ)
1 −∆SE1∆SJE1
∑mSJE1−1
n1=0
∑mSE1−1
n2=0
∑n2
p=0
∑mSR−1
n3=0
×B(n1,n2,n3,p)
{
FgSJP (σSJ ) Ξ
(n1,n2,n3,p,τ)
2 + Ξ
(n1,n2,n3,p,τ)
3
} ] . (35)
N (n2,n3,a,τ)1 =
%τD (ΥE2%E2)
a
υn3+τ+a+1SR

FgSP (σS)G
1,2
2,2
(
υSE1
υSR
∣∣∣∣ (1, 0) , (−n3 − τ − a, IσSυSR) ;−(n2+1, 0) ; (0, 0)
)
+ (λSPσS)
τ+a
(2pij)2
∫
Cs
Γ(n2+1+s)Γ(−s)
Γ(1−s)
(
υSE1
υSR
)−s
× ∫
Cw
Γ(−τ−a−w+1,λSPσS)Γ(n3+τ+a+1−s+w)Γ(w)
Γ(1+w)
(
IυSR
λSP
)−w
dsdw
 . (36)
Ξ
(n3,τ)
1 = e
(E2,τ)Ψ
(n3,ξ2E2 ,τ)
1 +
∞∑
k=0
e(E2,τ,k) (βE2 , αE2) Ψ
(n3,αE2+k,τ)
1 + e
(E2,τ,k) (αE2 , βE2) Ψ
(n3,βE2+k,τ)
1 . (37)
Ψ
(n3,a,τ)
1 =
%τD (ΥE2%E2)
a
υn3+τ+a+1SR
 FgSP (σS) Γ (n3 + τ + a+ 1, IσSυSR)
+ (σSλSP )
τ+a
G2,12,2
(
υSRI
λSP
∣∣∣∣ (τ + a, σSλSP ) ; (1, 0)(0, 0) , (n3 + τ + a+ 1, 0) ;−
)  . (38)
Ξ(n1,n2,n3,p,τ)n = e
(E2,τ)Ψ
(n1,n2,n3,p,ξ2E2 ,τ)
n +
∞∑
k=0
e(E2,τ,k) (βE2 , αE2) Ψ
(n1,n2,n3,p,αE2+k,τ)
n
+ e(E2,τ,k) (αE2 , βE2) Ψ
(n1,n2,n3,p,βE2+k,τ)
n , n ∈ {2, 3}. (39)
M(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) = G2,22,3
(
χσSJ
γI
∣∣∣∣ (−p, 0) , (1, 0) ;−(n1 + 1, 0) , (n2 + n3 − p+ 1 + τ + a, ζIσS) ; (0, 0)
)
. (40)
Y(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) = −λ
a+τ−1
SP
(2pij)
2
∫
Cs
Γ (n1 + 1 + s) Γ (1 + p− s)
s
(
χσSJ
γI
)−s
(41)
×
∫
Cw
Γ (n2 + n3 − p+ 1 + τ + a+ s+ w) Γ (1− a− τ − w, σSλSP )
w
(
ζI
λSP
)−w
dsdw.
Φ(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) = G2,33,3
(
χ
λSJP γI
∣∣∣∣ (−p, 0) , (1, 0) , (0, σSJλSJP ) ;−(n1 + 1, 0) , (n2 + n3 − p+ 1 + τ + a, ζIσS) ; (0, 0)
)
. (42)
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W(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) = −λ
a+τ−1
SP
(2pij)
2
∫
Cs
Γ (n1 + 1 + s) Γ (1 + p− s) Γ (1− s, σSJλSJP )
s
(
χ
λSJP γI
)−s
(43)
×
∫
Cw
Γ (n2 + n3 − p+ 1 + a+ τ + s+ w) Γ (1− a− τ − w, σSλSP )
w
(
ζI
λSP
)−w
dsdw.
IP(∞)P ∼ 1−
ξ2E2D
(0,∞)
P
Γ (αE2) Γ (βE2)
+ θ
[
e(D,0)D(ξ
2
D,∞)
P +
∞∑
k=0
e(D,0,k) (βD, αD)D(αD+i,∞)P + e(D,0,k) (αD, βD)D(βD+k,∞)P
]
. (46)
D(τ,∞)P = ΥτD∆SR
[ ∑mSR−1
n3=0
φ
(n3)
SR Ξ
(n3,τ)
1 −∆SE1∆SJE1
∑mSE1−1
n2=0
∑n2
p=0
∑mSR−1
n3=0
×
{
FgSJP (σSJ ) Ξ
(0,n2,n3,p,τ)
2 + Ξ
(0,n2,n3,p,τ)
3
}
B(n1,n2,n3,p)
]
. (47)
Ξ(0,n2,n3,p,τ)n = e
(E2,τ)Ψ
(0,n2,n3,p,ξ2E2 ,τ)
n +
∞∑
k=0
e(E2,τ,k) (βE2 , αE2) Ψ
(0,n2,n3,p,αE2+k,τ)
n
+ e(E2,τ,k) (αE2 , βE2) Ψ
(0,n2,n3,p,βE2+k,τ)
n , n ∈ {2, 3}. (48)
V(n2,n3,p,a,τ) = χΓ (2 + p)
γI
 FgSP (σS) Γ (n2 + n3 − p+ τ + a, ζIσS)
+ (λSPσS)
a+τ
G2,12,2
(
ζI
λSP
∣∣∣∣ (a+ τ, σSλSP ) ; (1, 0)(0, 0) , (n2+n3−p+ τ + a, 0) ;−
)  . (49)
1
2
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Fig. 8. IP vs ΩX and bX in the presence of a friendly jammer.
by increasing the maximum tolerated interference power at
the PU receiver and the sources transmit power. Interestingly,
we showed that friendly jammer does not contribute to the
enhancement of the SS when the transmit power of the source
or the maximum tolerated interference power at the PU is below
certain thresholds.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Using equations (14)-(17), the IP can be rewritten as
IP
(a)
= Pr (Csec ≤ 0| γR > γth) Pr (γR > γth) (50)
+ Pr (Csec ≤ 0| γR < γth) Pr (γR < γth)
(b)
= Pr (Csec ≤ 0| γR > γth) Pr (γR > γth)
+ Pr (γR < γth) ,
where step (a) is attained by using both total probability and
Bayes’ rules, while step (b) holds by noting that when γR < γth,
the satellite R fails to decode the received message from S and
therefore the communication could not be established between
the source and the destination (i.e. γD = γE2 = 0). It follows
that Csec = 0 and consequently, Pr (Csec ≤ 0| γR < γth) = 1.
On the other hand, by considering that
Pr (Csec ≤ 0| γR > γth) = Pr (γR > γth) (51)
− Pr (Csec > 0| γR > γth) ,
Substituting (15) and (51) into (50), the IP can be rewritten as
IP = 1− Pr (Csec > 0, γR > γth) , (52)
= 1− Pr (γR > γE1 , γR > γE2 , γD > γE2 , γR > γth)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
.
Obviously, the term I can be expressed as the sum of
six different probabilities (i.e. I =∑6i=1 Ii with Ii =
Pr (Ei, γD > γE2) where the events Ei are summarized in Table
III. Eqs. (48), (50), and (52) are obtained using integration by
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Fig. 2. IP vs γI in the presence of a friendly jammer for
different values of ΩX , ρD = 0.001, ρE2 = 0.01, σS =
σSJ = 1, I = 0.1, and bX = 4.
Fig. 3. IP vs γI for different values of γSJ .
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Fig. 6. IP vs µD for different values of ΩX . Fig. 7. IP vs ΩX for different values of bX .
I1 =
∫ ∞
0
fgSP (u) du
∫ ∞
γth
FγE1 |gSP=u (y)
[
fγR|gSP=u (y)
∫ y
γth
fγE2 (z)F
c
γD (z) dz
−F cγR|gSP=u (y) fγE2 (y)F cγD (y)
]
dy. (48)
I2 =
∫ ∞
0
fgSP (u) du
∫ ∞
γth
F cγR|gSP=u (z) fγE2 (z)F
c
γD (z)
[
FγE1 |gSP=u (z)− FγE1 |gSP=u (γth)
]
dz. (49)
I3 =
∫ ∞
0
F cγR|gSP=u (γth) fgSP (u)
∫ γth
0
FγE1 |gSP=u (y) fγE2 (y)F
c
γD (y) dudy. (50)
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I4 =
∫ ∞
0
F cγR|gSP=u (γth) fgSP (u)
∫ γth
0
fγE2 (z)F
c
γD (z)
[
FγE1 |gSP=u (γth)− FγE1 |gSP=u (z)
]
dudz. (51)
I5 =
∫ ∞
0
FγE1 |gSP=u (γth) fgSP (u)
[∫ ∞
γth
fγE2 (x)F
c
γD (x)−
∫ ∞
γth
FγR|gSP=u (x) fγE2 (x)F
c
γD (x)
]
dudx. (52)
I6 =
∫ ∞
0
fgSP (u)
∫ ∞
γth
fγR|gSP=u (x)
[
FγE1 |gSP=u (x)− FγE1 |gSP=u (γth)
]
dxdu×
∫ γth
0
fγE2 (z)F
c
γD (z) dz. (53)
TABLE III: Events for I.
Event Event
E1 γR > γE1 > γE2 > γth E4 γR > γth > γE1 > γE2
E2 γR > γE2 > γE1 > γth E5 γR > γE2 > γth > γE1
E3 γR > γth > γE2 > γE1 E6 γR > γE1 > γth > γE2
parts alongside some algebraic manipulations, while (49), (51),
and (53) can be achieved by applying the basic definition of the
CDF.
By performing a summation of (48)-(53) and substituting I
into (52), (18) is attained, which concludes the proof of Lemma
1.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To prove the IP expression given in (14) in both the absence
and presence of friendly jammer cases, it is mandatory to
compute J1 (y, u), J2 (y), and R1 (u). As one can see from
(20) and (21), to compute J1 (y, u) it is sufficient to derive
the conditional CDFs of (4), (5) and (6), while J2 (y) can be
attained using (10) and (11).
To do so, we start by computing the conditional CDF of γR
for a given gSP as follows
FγR|gSP=u (y) = Pr (γR ≤ y |gSP = u ) (54)
(a)
= FgSR
(
y
Ω (u)
)
,
where Ω (u) = γS if u ≤ σS and Ω (u) = γIu if u > σS , with
σS is defined in Theorem 1, and Step (a) holds by using (4).
• Absence of friendly jammer case.
Using (5), the conditional CDF of γE1 for a given gSP can
be expressed as
FγE1 |gSP=u (y) = Pr
(
min
(
γS ,
γI
u
)
gSE1 ≤ y
)
(55)
= FgSE1
(
y
Ω (u)
)
.
Substituting (54) and (55) into (20), yields
J1 (y, u) = 1
Ω (u)
fgSR
(
y
Ω (u)
)
FgSE1
(
y
Ω (u)
)
. (56)
Now, substituting (10) into (11), the term J1 (y, u) can be
rewritten as
J1 (y, u) = ∆SE1∆SRe
− υSR
Ω(u)
y
Ω (u)
mSE1−1∑
n2=0
φ
(n2)
SE1
υn2+1SE1
(57)
× γinc
(
n2+1,
υSE1
Ω (u)
y
)mSR−1∑
n3=0
φ
(n3)
SR
Ωn3 (u)
yn3 .
Next, the term J2 (y) given in (21) can be expressed as
J2 (y) = FγE2 (y)−
∫ y
z=0
fγE2 (z)FγD (z) dz. (58)
By substituting (12) and (13) into (58), we get
J2 (y) = FγE2 (y)− θ
×
∫ y
z=0
1
z
G3,01,3
(
ΥE2z
µ
(E2)
1
∣∣∣∣ −; ξ2E2 + 1ξ2E2 , αE2 , βE2 ;−
)
×G3,12,4
(
ΥDz
µ
(D)
1
∣∣∣∣ 1; ξ2D + 1ξ2D, αD, βD; 0
)
dz, (59)
where θ is defined in Theorem 1.
To compute (59), we can express one of the two Meijer’s G-
functions as an infinite sum of the respective integrand’s residues
evaluated at the appropriate poles [29, Theorem 1.5]. That is,
G3,12,4
(
y
∣∣∣∣ 1− τ ; ξ2Z + 1ξ2Z , αZ , βZ ;−τ
)
= e(Z,τ)yξ
2
Z (60)
+
∞∑
k=0
e(Z,τ,k) (βZ , αZ) y
αZ+k
+
∞∑
k=0
e(Z,τ,k) (αZ , βZ) y
βZ+k,
where τ = {0, q}, q takes a value in the set {ξ2D, αD +k, βD +
k}, e(Z,τ), and e(Z,τ,k) (., .) are defined in Theorem 1.
Substituting (60) into (59), yields
J2 (y) = Fγ(k)E2 (y)− θ (61)
×
 e(D,0)P (ξ2D, y)+∑∞k=0 e(D,0,k) (βD, αD)P (αD + k, y)
+
∑∞
k=0 e
(D,0,k) (αD, βD)P (βD + k, y)
 ,
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with
P (q, y) =
(
ΥD
µ
(D)
1
)q ∫ y
0
zq−1 (62)
×G3,01,3
(
ΥE2z
µ
(E2)
1
∣∣∣∣ −; ξ2E2 + 1ξ2E2 , αE2 , βE2 ;−
)
dz
(a)
=
(
ΥDy
µ
(D)
1
)q
G3,12,4
(
ΥE2y
µ
(E2)
1
∣∣∣∣ 1− q; ξ2E2 + 1ξ2E2 , αE2 , βE2 ;−q
)
,
where step (a) follows using [28, Eq. 07.34.21.0003.01].
Replacing, (57) and (61) into (19), one can obtain
R1 (u) =
ξ2
E2
L(0)1 (u)
Γ (αE2) Γ (βE2)
(63)
− θ
 e(D,0)L(
ξ2D)
1 (u)
+
∑∞
k=0 e
(D,0,k) (βD, αD)L(αD+k)1 (u)
+
∑∞
k=0 e
(D,0,k) (αD, βD)L(βD+k)1 (u)
 ,
where
L(τ)1 (u) = ∆SE1∆SR
(
ΥD
µ
(D)
1
)τ
(64)
×
mSE1−1∑
n2=0
φ
(n2)
SE1
υn2+1SE1
mSR−1∑
n3=0
φ
(n3)
SR
Ωn3+1 (u)
×
∫ ∞
y=γth
yτ+n3γinc
(
n2+1,
υSE1
Ω (u)
y
)
e−
υSR
Ω(u)
y
×G3,12,4
(
ΥE2y
µ
(E2)
1
∣∣∣∣ 1− τ ; ξ2E2 + 1ξ2E2 , αE2 , βE2 ;−τ
)
dy.
Now, replacing (60) into (64), yields
L(τ)1 (u) = ∆SE1∆SR
(
ΥD
µ
(D)
1
)τ
(65)
×
mSE1−1∑
n2=0
φ
(n2)
SE1
υn2+1SE1
mSR−1∑
n3=0
φ
(n3)
SR
Ωn3+1 (u)
×
 e
(E2,τ)z(
n2,n3,ξ
2
E2
,τ)
1 (u)
+
∑∞
k=0 e
(E2,τ,k) (βE2 , αE2)z
(n2,n3,αE2+k,τ)
1 (u)
+
∑∞
k=0 e
(E2,τ,k) (αE2 , βE2)z
(n2,n3,βE2+k,τ)
1 (u)
 ,
with
z(n2,n3,a,τ)1 (u) =
(
ΥE2
µ
(E2)
1
)a ∫ ∞
y=γth
yτ+n3+a (66)
× e−
υSR
Ω(u)
yγinc
(
n2+1,
υSE1
Ω (u)
y
)
dy,
where a belongs to the set {ξ2E2 , αE2 + k, βE2 + k}.
Using [28, Eq. (06.06.26.0004.01)], (66) can be expressed as
z(n2,n3,a,τ)1 (u) =
(
ΥE2
µ
(E2)
1
)a(
Ω (u)
υSR
)l+1
(67)
×G1,22,2
(
υSE1
υSR
∣∣∣∣ (1, 0) , (−l, ς) ;−(n2+1, 0) ; (0, 0)
)
,
with l = n3 + τ + a and ς = γthυSRΩ(u) .
Now, substituting (63) into (18) , the IP in the absence of a
friendly jammer can be written as
IPA = 1−
ξ2E2D
(0)
A
Γ (αE2) Γ (βE2)
(68)
+ θ
 e(D,0)D(
ξ2D)
A
+
∑∞
k=0 e
(D,0,k) (βD, αD)D(αD+k)A
+
∑∞
k=0 e
(D,0,k) (αD, βD)D(βD+k)A
 ,
where
D(τ)A =
ΥτD(
µ
(D)
1
)τ ∫ ∞
u=0
fgSP (u)L(τ)1 (u) du, (69)
To compute (69) , we need to replace Ω (u) by its values.
Therefore, when u ≤ σS the term L(τ)1 (u) becomes constant.
Thus,
D(τ)A =
ΥτD(
µ
(D)
1
)τ [L(τ)2 (γS)FgSP (σS) + λSPL(τ)2 (γI)] ,
(70)
with L(τ)2 (γI) =
∫∞
σS
e−λSPuL(τ)1 (u) du.
The term L(τ)2 (γS) and L(τ)2 (γI) can be obtained by replac-
ing Ω (u) = γS and Ω (u) =
γI
u in (65) and (67), respectively.
Therefore, L(τ)2 (γI) can be rewritten as
L(τ)2 (γI) = ∆SE1∆SR
(
ΥD
µ
(D)
1
)τ
(71)
×
mSR−1∑
n3=0
φ
(n3)
SR
γn3+1I
mSE1−1∑
n2=0
φ
(n2)
SE1
υn2+1SE1
×
 e
(E2,τ)z(
n2,n3,ξ
2
E2
,τ)
2
+
∑∞
k=0 e
(E2,τ,k)
(
βE2 , αE2
)
z(
n2,n3,αE2+k,τ)
2
+
∑∞
k=0 e
(E2,τ,k)
(
αE2 , βE2
)
z(
n2,n3,βE2+k,τ)
2
 ,
where
z(n2,n3,a,τ)2 =
(
ΥE2
µ
(E2)
1
)a ∫ ∞
σS
e−λSPu (72)
× un3+1z(n2,n3,αE2+k,τ)1 (u) du
=
(
γI
υSR
)τ+n3+a+1 1
2pij
∫
Cs
Γ (n2+1 + s)
Γ (1− s)
× Γ (−s)
(
υSE1
υSR
)−s ∫ ∞
σS
u−τ−ae−λSPu
× Γ (1 + n3 + τ + a− s, IυSRu) dsdu,
where I is defined in Theorem 1.
Using [28, Eq. (06.06.26.0005.01)], one obtains).
z(n2,n3,a,τ)2 =
(
ΥE2
µ
(E2)
1
)a(
γI
υSR
)τ+n3+a+1 λa+τ−1SP
(2pij)
2 (73)
×
∫
Cs
Γ (n2+1 + s) Γ (−s)
Γ (1− s)
(
υSE1
υSR
)−s
×
∫
Cw
Γ (−τ − a− w + 1, λSPσS) (IυSR)−w
wλ−wSP
× Γ (τ + n3 + a+ 1− s+ w) dwds,
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• Presence of a friendly jammer.
Using (6), the conditional CDF of γ(J)E1 for a given gSP can
be expressed as
F
γ
(J)
E1
|gSP=u (y) = Pr (US ≤ y (USJ + 1)) (74a)
= 1− y
Ω (u)
∫ ∞
0
fgSE1
(
y (t+ 1)
Ω (u)
)
(74b)
× FUSJ (t) dt,
where (74b) holds by using integration by parts.
On the other hand, the CDF of USJ is given by
FUSJ (t) = Pr
(
min
(
γSJ ,
γI
gSJP
)
gSJE1 ≤ t
)
(75)
= FgSJE1
(
t
γSJ
)
FgSJP (σSJ )
+
∫ ∞
σSJ
FgSJE1
(
t
γI
y
)
fgSJP (y) dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
K1
.
where σSJ is defined in Theorem 1.
Using (11) and [28, Eq. (06.06.26.0004.01)], the term K1 can
be expressed as
K1 = λSJP∆SJE1
mSJE1−1∑
n1=0
φ
(n1)
SJE1
υn1+1SJE1
(76)
×
∫ ∞
σSJ
e−λSJP yG1,11,2
(
υSJE1t
γI
y
∣∣∣∣ 1;−n1 + 1; 0
)
dy
= ∆SJE1
mSJE1−1∑
n1=0
φ
(n1)
SJE1
υn1+1SJE1
G1 (t) ,
where G1 (t) = G1,22,2
(
υSJE1 t
γIλSJP
∣∣∣∣ (1, 0) , (0, σSJλSJP ) ;−(n1 + 1, 0) ; (0, 0)
)
.
Substituting (76) into (75), yields the CDF of USJ
FUSJ (t) = FgSJE1
(
t
γSJ
)
FgSJP (σSJ ) (77)
+ ∆SJE1
mSJE1−1∑
n1=0
φ
(n1)
SJE1
υn1+1SJE1
G1 (t) .
Now, replacing (77) into (75), the CDF of γE1 can be expressed
as
F
γ
(J)
E1
|gSP=u (y) = 1−
y∆SE1
Ω (u)
e−
υSE1
Ω(u)
y
mSE1−1∑
n2=0
φ
(n2)
SE1
yn2
Ωn2 (u)
(78)
×
n2∑
p=0
(
n2
p
)
∆SJE1
mSJE1−1∑
n1=0
φ
(n1)
SJE1
υn1+1SJE1
×
[
FgSJP (σSJ )V1 (y, u) + V2 (y, u)
]
dt,
where
V1 (y, u) =
∫ ∞
0
tpe−
υSE1
y
Ω(u)
tγinc
(
n1 + 1,
υSJE1
γSJ
t
)
dt, (79)
and
V2 (y, u) =
∫ ∞
0
tpe−
υSE1
y
Ω(u)
tG1 (t) dt, (80)
Using [28, Eq.(07.34.21.0088.01)], the term V1 (y, u) can be
expressed as
V1 (y, u) =
(
Ω (u)
υSE1y
)p+1
G1,22,2
(
υSJE1Ω (u)
υSE1γSJ y
∣∣∣∣ −p, 1;−n1 + 1; 0
)
,
(81)
while the term V2 (y, u) can be evaluated as
V2 (y, u) =
(
Ω (u)
υSE1y
)p+1
G2 (y, u) , (82)
where G2 (y, u) = G1,33,2
(
ρ
∣∣∣∣ (1, 0) , (0, l) , (−p, 0) ;−(n1 + 1, 0) ; (0, 0)
)
, l =
σSJλSJP , and ρ =
υSJE1Ω(u)
λSJP υSE1γIy
.
Replacing (81) and (82) into (78), and then substituting the
obtained expression of FγE1 |gSP=u (y) alongside (54) into (20),
the term J1 (y, u) can be expressed as
J1 (y, u) = ∆SR
mSR−1∑
n3=0
φ
(n3)
SR y
n3
Ωn3+1 (u)
e−
υSR
Ω(u)
y (83)
−∆SR∆SJE1∆SE1
mSJE1−1∑
n1=0
mSE1−1∑
n2=0
n2∑
p=0
mSR−1∑
n3=0
× B
(n1,n2,n3,p)
Ωn2+n3−p+1 (u)
e−
ζ
Ω(u)
yyn2+n3−p
×
 FgSJP (σSJ )G1,22,2(υSJE1Ω(u)υSE1γSJ y
∣∣∣∣ −p, 1;−n1 + 1; 0
)
+G2 (y, u)
 ,
where B(n1,n2,n3,p) is defined in Theorem 1.
Now, substituting (83) and (61) into (19), the term U1 (u) can
be expressed as
U1 (u) =
ξ2E2T
(0)
1 (u)
Γ (αE2) Γ (βE2)
(84)
− θ
 e(D,0)T (
ξ2D)
1 (u)
+
∑∞
k=0 e
(D,0,k) (βD, αD) T (αD+k)1 (u)
+
∑∞
k=0 e
(D,0,k) (αD, βD) T βD+k1 (u)
 ,
where
T (τ)1 (u) =
(
ΥD
µ
(D)
1
)τ ∫ ∞
y=γth
J1 (y, u)
y−τ
(85)
×G3,12,4
(
ΥE2y
µ
(E2)
1
∣∣∣∣ 1− τ ; ξ2E2 + 1ξ2E2 , αE2 , βE2 ;−τ
)
.
Using (83), the terms T (τ)1 (u) can be expressed as
T (τ)1 (u) = ∆SR
(
ΥD
µ
(D)
1
)τ mSR−1∑
n3=0
φ
(n3)
SR Θ
(n3,τ)
1 (u)
Ωn3+1 (u)
−∆SR∆SJE1∆SE1
(
ΥD
µ
(D)
1
)τ
×
mSJE1−1∑
n1=0
mSE1−1∑
n2=0
n2∑
p=0
mSR−1∑
n3=0
B(n1,n2,n3,p)
Ωn2−p+n3+1 (u)
×
[
FgSJP (σSJ ) Θ
(n1,n2,n3,p,τ)
2 (u)
+Θ
(n1,n2,n3,p,τ)
3 (u)
]
, (86)
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where
Θ
(n3,τ)
1 (u) =
∫ ∞
γth
e−
υSR
Ω(u)
y
y−n3−τ
(87)
×G3,12,4
(
ΥE2y
µ
(E2)
1
∣∣∣∣ 1− τ ; ξ2E2+1ξ2E2 , αE2 , βE2 ;−τ
)
dy,
Θ
(n1,n2,n3,p,τ)
2 (u) =
∫ ∞
γth
e−
ζ
Ω(u)
y
y−n2−n3+p−τ
×G3,12,4
(
ΥE2y
µ
(E2)
1
∣∣∣∣ 1− τ ; ξ2E2+1ξ2E2 , αE2 , βE2 ;−τ
)
×G1,22,2
(
υSJE1Ω (u)
υSE1γSJ y
∣∣∣∣ −p, 1;−n1+1; 0
)
dy,
(88)
and
Θ
(n1,n2,n3,p,τ)
3 (u) =
∫ ∞
y=γth
e−
ζ
Ω(u)
y
y−n2−n3+p−τ
G2 (y, u) (89)
×G3,12,4
(
ΥE2y
µ
(E2)
1
∣∣∣∣ 1− τ ; ξ2E2+1ξ2E2 , αE2 , βE2 ;−τ
)
dy,
Using (60), (87) can be expressed as
Θ
(n3,τ)
1 (u) = e
(E2,τ)Λ
(n3,ξ2E2 ,τ)
1 (u) (90)
+
∞∑
k=0
e(E2,τ,k)
(
βE2 , αE2
)
Λ
(n3,αE2+k,τ)
1 (u)
+
∞∑
k=0
e(E2,τ,k)
(
αE2 , βE2
)
Λ
(n3,βE2+k,τ)
1 (u) ,
where
Λ
(n3,a,τ)
1 (u) =
(
ΥE2
µ
(E2)
1
)a(
Ω (u)
υSR
)τ+n3+a+1
(91)
× Γ
(
τ + n3 + a+ 1,
γthυSR
Ω (u)
)
,
g(a, u, τ) = and a = {ξ2E2 , αE2 + k, βE2 + k}.
Similarly to (90), (88) can be expressed as
Θ
(n1,n2,n3,p,τ)
2 (u) = e
(E2,τ)M(n1,n2,n3,p,ξ
2
E2
,τ)
1 (u)
+
∞∑
k=0
Λ
(αE2+k)
2 (u, βE2 , αE2)
+
∞∑
k=0
Λ
(βE2+k)
2 (u, αE2 , βE2) , (92)
where
Λ
(a)
2 (u, x, y) = e
(E2,τ,k) (x, y)M(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ)1 (u) , (93)
M(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ)1 (u) =
(
ΥE2
µ
(E2)
1
)a(
Ω (u)
ζ
)κ
H1 (u) , (94)
with κ = n2 + n3 − p + 1 + a + τ, H1 (u) =
G2,22,3
(
χ
γSJ
∣∣∣∣∣ (−p, 0) , (1, 0) ;−(n1+1, 0) ,(κ, ζγthΩ(u)) ; (0, 0)
)
, and χ is defined
in Theorem 1.
Analogously to (88) and (89), the term Θ(n2,n3,p)3 (u) can be
evaluated as
Θ
(n1,n2,n3,p,τ)
3 (u) = e
(E2,τ)Φ
(n1,n2,n3,p,ξ2E2 ,τ)
1 (u) (95)
+
∞∑
k=0
Λ
(αE2+k)
3 (u, βE2 , αE2)
+
∞∑
k=0
Λ
(βE2+k)
3 (u, αE2 , βE2) ,
where
Λ
(a)
3 (u, x, y) = e
(E2,τ,k) (x, y) Φ
(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ)
1 (u) , (96)
Φ
(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ)
1 (u) =
(
ΥE2
µ
(E2)
1
)a(
Ω (u)
ζ
)κ
(97)
×G2,33,3
(
b
∣∣∣∣ (−p, 0) , (1, 0) , (0, c) ;−(n1+1, 0) , (κ, v) ; (0, 0)
)
.
where b = χλSJP γI
, c = σSJλSJP , and v =
ζγth
Ω(u) .
Now, the remaining last step in this proof consists of com-
puting the expression for the IP in the presence of a friendly
jammer by incorporating (84) into (18) as
IPP = 1−
ξ2E2D
(0)
P
Γ (αE2) Γ (βE2)
(98)
+ θ
 e(D,0)D(
ξ2D)
P
+
∑∞
k=0 e
(D,0,k) (βD, αD)D(αD+k)P
+
∑∞
k=0 e
(D,0,k) (αD, βD)D(βD+k)P
 ,
where
D(τ)P =
ΥτD(
µ
(D)
1
)τ ∫ ∞
u=0
fgSP (u) T (τ)1 (u) du. (99)
To compute (99) , we need to replace Ω (u) by its values in (86).
Therefore, when u ≤ σS , the term T (τ)1 (u) becomes constant.
It follows that
D(τ)P =
T (τ)2 (γS)FgSP (σS) + λSPT (τ)2 (γI)(
µ
(D)
1
)τ , (100)
with T (τ)2 (γI) =
∫∞
σS
e−λSPuT (τ)1 (u) , while the term
T (τ)2 (γS) can be obtained by replacing Ω (u) = γS in (86).
Also, to compute T (τ)2 (γI), we need to replace Ω (u) = γIu
in (86) and compute the following integrals
S(n3,a,τ) =
∫ ∞
σS
e−λSPu
ua+τ
Γ (τ + n3 + a+ 1, IυSRu) du,
(101)
Y(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) =
∫ ∞
σS
e−λSPu
ua+τ
M(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ)1 (u) du,
(102)
and
W(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) =
∫ ∞
σS
e−λSPu
ua+τ
Φ
(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ)
1 (u) du,
(103)
where I is defined is Theorem 1.
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Using [28, Eq. 06.06.26.0005.01], (101) can be expressed as
S(n3,a,τ) =
G2,12,2
(
ε
∣∣∣∣ (a+ τ, λSPσS) ; (1, 0)(0, 0) , (τ + n3 + a+ 1, 0) ;−
)
λ−a−τ+1SP
,
(104)
with ε = IυSRλSP , while (102) and (103) can be evaluated by
replacing Ω (u) = γIu into (94) and (97), respectively, and
calculating the following common integral
A(n1,n2,n3,p,τ) =
∫ ∞
σS
u−a−τe−λSPuΓ (κ + s, Iζu) du
(105)
(a)
=
1
2pij
∫
Cw
Γ (w) Γ (κ + s+ w)
Γ (1 + w)
×
(
Iζ
λSP
)−w
Γ (1− a− τ − w, σSλSP )
λ−a−τ+1SP
dw,
where step (a) follows using [28, Eq. 06.06.26.0005.01].
Finally, substituting (105) into (102) and (103), one obtains
(41) and (43) which concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
One can clearly see from (33) and (35) that the asymptotic
expression for the IP depends on approximating (39), which
can be obtained by determining the asymptotic expansion of
(25) and (26). To do so, the residues theorem is applied to find
the asymptotic expressions of functions given in (40)-(43).
First, the functions given in (40) and (42) can be rewritten as
Mellin-Barnes integrals as
M(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) = 1
2pij
∫
C
Γ (n1 + 1 + s) Γ (κ + s, ζIσS)
Γ (1− s)
(106)
× Γ (1 + p− s) Γ (−s)
(
χσSJ
γI
)−s
ds,
and
Φ(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) =
1
2pij
∫
C
Γ (n1 + 1 + s) Γ (κ + s, ζIσS)
Γ (1− s)
(107)
× Γ (1 + p− s) Γ (−s)
× Γ (1− s, σSJλSJP )
(
χ
λSJP γI
)−s
ds,
where κ = n2 + n3 − p + 1 + a + τ, and j =
√−1, Cs is a
vertical line of integration chosen such as to separate the left
poles of the above integrand functions from the right ones,
It is noteworthy that the same complex contour, namely Cs
can be used to evaluate both integrals as the upper incomplete
Gamma function has no poles and both integrands have the
same poles. Moreover, the conditions of [29, Theorem 1.5] hold.
That is, the two above complex integrals can be written as an
infinite sum of the poles belonging to the left half plan of C.
Furthermore, it is clearly seen that (106) and (107) both have
same left poles −n1 − 1− k, k ∈ N. It follows that
M(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) =
∞∑
k=0
(−1)kΓ (2 + p+ n1 + k)
k! (n1 + 1 + k) γ
n1+1+k
I
× Γ (κ − n1 − 1− k, ζIσS)
(χσSJ )
−n1−1−k , (108)
and
Φ(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) =
∞∑
k=0
(−1)kΓ (2 + p+ n1 + k)
k! (n1 + 1 + k) (λSJP γI)
n1+1+k
(109)
× Γ (κ − n1 − 1− k, ζIσS)
× Γ (2 + n1 + k, σSJλSJP )χn1+1+k.
By considering only the first term of the infinite summation
when γI →∞, (108) and (109) can be asymptotically approx-
imated by
M(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) ∼ Γ (κ − n1 − 1− k, ζIσS)
n1 + 1
× Γ (2 + p+ n1)
(
χσSJ
γI
)n1+1
, (110)
Φ(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) ∼ Γ (2 + n1, σSJλSJP )
n1 + 1
(111)
× Γ (2 + p+ n1)
(
χ
λSJP γI
)n1+1
× Γ (κ − n1 − 1, ζIσS) .
In similar manner to (108) and (109), (41) and (43) can be,
respectively, expressed as infinite sums as follows
Y(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) = λ
a+τ−1
SP
2pij
∫
Cw
Γ (1− a− τ − w, σSλSP )
w
(
ζI
λSP
)w
×

∑∞
k=0
(−1)kΓ(2+p+n1+k)
k!(n1+1+k)γ
n1+1+k
I
×Γ(κ+w−n1−1−k)
(χσSJ )
−n1−1−k
+ (−1)
kΓ(n1+1−κ−w−k)
k!(κ+w+k)γκ+w+kI
×Γ(1+p+κ+w+k)
(χσSJ )
−κ−w−k
 dw,
(112)
and
W(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) =
∫
Cw
Γ (1− a− τ − w, σSλSP )
w
(
ζI
λSP
)−w
×

∑∞
k=0
(−1)kΓ(2+p+n1+k)
k!(n1+1+k)
Γ (κ + w − n1 − 1− k)
×Γ (2 + n1+k, σSJλSJP )
×
(
χ
λSJP γI
)n1+1+k
+ (−1)
kΓ(n1+1−κ−w−k))
k!(κ+w+k)
×Γ (1 + p+ κ + w + k)
×Γ (1 + κ + w + k, σSJλSJP )
×
(
χ
λSJP γI
)κ+w+k

dw,
(113)
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Subsequently, their asymptotic expression in high SNR
regime can be straightforwardly obtained by taking the first term
of the two above infinite summations as
Y(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) ∼ λ
a+τ−1
SP Γ (2 + p+ n1)
n1 + 1
(
χσSJ
γI
)n1+1
(114)
×G2,12,2
(
ζI
λSP
∣∣∣∣ (a+ τ, σSλSP ) ; (1, 0)(0, 0) , (κ − n1−1, 0) ;−
)
,
and
W(n1,n2,n3,p,a,τ) ∼ λ
a+τ−1
SP Γ (2 + p+ n1)
n1 + 1
(115)
× Γ (2 + n1, σSJλSJP )
(
χ
λSJP γI
)n1+1
×G2,12,2
(
ζI
λSP
∣∣∣∣ (a+ τ, σSλSP ) ; (1, 0)(0, 0) , (κ − n1−1, 0) ;−
)
.
Lastly, substituting (110) alongside (114) and (111) along with
(115) into (25) and (26), respectively, (44) and (45) are attained.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
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